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ABSTRACT 
 
 Over a portion of the older limestone mine workings at the 
NIOSH Lake Lynn Laboratory, a mining health and safety 
research facility, a large sinkhole formed caused in part by the 
intersection of several tightly spaced joint sets and unusual 
weather conditions.  The anticipated propagation of the 
associated roof failures threatened to encroach upon a portion of 
the facility’s secondary escapeway.  To protect the escapeway, 
two cribs walls and over 80 cable bolts were installed. In addition, 
extensometers were installed to monitor roof movement in the 
escapeway.  However, a large roof fall associated with the 
propagating roof failures in the sinkhole area partially destroyed 
one crib wall where the adjacent escapeway was not reinforced 
by cable bolts. Recent roof movement information indicates that 
this area is still active.  Based on these measurements, steps 
have been taken to stabilize this portion of the escapeway.  This 
paper discusses roof monitoring, the roof movement, the large 
roof fall, propagation of the roof failures, and the recent support 
measures undertaken to stabilize the escapeway. 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
 The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) Lake Lynn Laboratory, a mining health and safety 
research facility is located along Chestnut ridge on the 
Pennsylvania-West Virginia border near Uniontown, PA.  
Stratigraphically, the facility is in the Greenbrier limestone of the 
Mauch Chunk Formation. This unit is composed primarily of a 
hard gray massive limestone that is interbedded with shales. The 
underground portion of the facility consists of the old mine works 
and the new research galleries. 
 
 The old mine works were part of an underground limestone 
mine developed in the mid 1960’s and early 1970’s from a 
highwall of a surface quarry escapeway (Mattes, et al., 1983 and 
Triebsch and Sapko, 1990).  Approximately 2,300 m of entry was 
developed with rooms 15.2 m wide by 9.1 m high and 15.2 m 
wide pillars.  In 1979, new galleries were developed from the 
older works to provide representative coal mine-sized openings 
for research.  These galleries consist of about 2,300 m of 5.5 m 
wide by 2.0 m high entries.  To provide access to the original 
underground quarry, four portals were driven into the highwall of 
the surface quarry.  Portal 1 is used as the primary mine entrance 
while portal 2 functions as the secondary escapeway (figure 1).  
 
In the late 1990’s two hydrostatic chambers were constructed 
at the furthest extent of the old workings to allow for full scale 
testing of mine seals.  In addition to providing access, ventilation 
and escapeways for the new research galleries, portions of the 
old mine are now being used for research studies.  As 
underground limestone mining industry continues to expand, the 
importance of the old mine workings for conducting health and 
safety research related in large opening mines will also increase.  
Therefore the stability of the old workings is critical to facilitating 
this planned research. 
 
 
ROOF COLLAPSE AND SINK HOLE FORMATION 
 
 On January 25, 1994 a large roof collapse occurred in the 
old workings near portals 3 and 4 and in close proximity to the 
highwall.  The roof fall encompassed approximately 2,550 m2 of 
entries and crosscuts.  Over the collapsed area, the overburden 
thickness was approximately 30.5 m.  Given the relatively shallow 
depth and the intersection of two significant joint sets observable 
through most of the roof rock units a sinkhole formed during the 
initial collapse.  With time, the underground failure and sinkhole 
have expanded.  Figure 1 shows the location of the original roof 
collapse and sinkhole as well the extension of the failure. 
 
 Several factors contributed to the roof collapse and the 
sinkhole formation.  These factors have been discussed in 
previous reports but will also be summarized as follows below 
Zelanko, et al., 1996 and Iannachione et al., 1995).  Two key 
elements were the joint systems and water.  The dominant joint 
set is oriented at N 70E E nearly parallel with the highwall.  Two 
less significant joint sets are oriented at N 20E E and N 45E W.  
All three sets of joints are near vertical.  The three near vertical 
joint sets outlined large blocks of limestone in the roof of the 
collapsed area.  Furthermore, surface and ground water had 
proculated through the joints and eroded the calcareous rock.  
These eroded joints were then in filled with low strength sandy 
clay, thereby, reducing the rock mass strength.  Also, the shallow 
depth of the site and the proximity of the highwall resulted in low 
normal stresses across the joints (Iannachione et al., 2002). 
 
Figure 1. Sinkhole, roof collapse and roof reinforcement 
area at Lake Lynn. 
 
 
 
 
 Mine design in the form of excessive roof spans for the 
geologic conditions may also have been a factor.  The rock mass 
rating using the Norwegian Geotechnical Institute Q system was 
28.13 and using Bieniawski’s Rock Mass Rating (RMR) was 67.  
These ratings indicate a good roof where the maximum span for a 
permanent opening based on the Q-system rating is 15.2 m.  
Although the entry spans were 15.2 m, intersection spans 
approached 22.9 m.  The staggered pillar design employed also 
resulted in significant roof spans. 
 
 Finally, weather conditions may have triggered the roof 
collapse.  Extremely cold weather resulted in a significant ice 
build up along the highwall and in the portal areas.  A sudden 
warming trend then allowed snow to melt above the mine thus 
increasing the water level in the overburden.  The highwall ice 
barriers could have restricted water flow from the overburden 
causing a build up of water pressure in the overburden and 
reducing the effective stress along the near vertical joint sets to a 
level that allowed the roof to collapse (Iannachione et al., 1995).  
 
 Although the roof collapse and sinkhole formed in the old 
workings, there was the potential that the failure could expand 
along the dominant joint set toward the nearby secondary 
escapeway.  Expansion of the failure into the escapeway would 
seriously impact the operation of the facility.  Therefore, a 
decision was made to reinforce and protect the secondary 
escapeway and to install instrumentation in the roof to monitor 
roof behavior.  The design of the reinforcement was based on the 
structural and geologic conditions in the roof of the escapeway.  
The instrumentation would be used to determine whether the 
reinforcement maintained stability, and would ultimately identify 
the need for further action to protect the secondary escapeway. 
 
 
 
 
 
GEOLOGY AND STRUCTURE IN VICINITY OF SECONDARY 
ESCAPE WAY 
 
 To evaluate the geology and structure, two drill core holes 
(one core hole was angled 30 degrees from vertical) and several 
borescope holes have been drilled in and near the secondary 
escapeway (figure 2).  A geologic column of the roof in the 
secondary escapeway based on the drill core obtained 
underground is shown in figure 3.  The immediate roof consists of 
a competent gray limestone to a depth of 4.3 m.  Above the 
limestone there are a series of red claystones and gray shales to 
a depth of 6.1 m.  The claystones and shales are then overlain by 
2.7 m of fined-grained limestone.  
 
 Several fractures and joints were observed in the core from 
both the lower and upper limestone sections.  At a roof depth of 
between 0.9 and 1.2 m, sections of core were missing.  This zone 
appears to correspond to a major separation along the bedding 
that was also noted in several observations holes in the 
secondary escapeway.  In these holes the bedding separations 
and even open breaks in boreholes were observed at depths of 
1.52 to 1.68 m in the mine roof (Molinda et al., 1996).  In an 
adjacent area, the open fractures were noted at depths of 1.83 
and 2.44 m in the roof.  
Figure 2.  Location of roof reinforcement and instru-
mentation in the vicinity of the secondary escape way. 
Figure 3. Roof geology observed in secondary escape way. 
 
 
 
 
 The roof in the area of the secondary escapeway is heavily 
jointed with near vertical joints spaced between 0.3 to 1.83 m 
apart and orientated mainly N 70  E.  These joints are nearly 
perpendicular to the orientation of the entries and parallel to the 
crosscuts and the highwall.  However, some of the joints are 
inclined from vertical and intersect the adjacent near vertical 
joints, forming small wedges that are no more than 0.3 to 0.61 m 
wide that can fall out from the roof.  Figure 4 shows these 
dominant roof joints crossing an entry adjacent to the secondary 
escapeway.  In general, the joint density increases towards the 
portals and highwall.  The vertical extent of most of these joints is 
not known but there appears to be several large joints or zones 
with several closely spaced joints with spacing between 6.1 to 
9.1 m that may have a much greater vertical depth, possibly up 
through the shale.  These large fractures and joints appear to be 
the main avenues for water seeping through the roof.  The 
dominant joint and fracture system as well as the shale zone in 
the roof were taken into account in the design of the original 
reinforcement system installed in the escapeway 
 
 
REINFORCEMENT OF SECONDARY ESCAPE WAY 
 
 Because of the potential for the failure to extend along the 
dominant joint set oriented at N 70 ˚E, the secondary escape way 
was reinforced in July of 1994 (figure 1).  The design of the 
reinforcement systems developed to protect the secondary 
escape way focused on three elements: (1) isolating the 
secondary escape way from the collapse, (2) reinforcing the 
secondary escape way roof structure and (3) reducing the inflow 
of water through the roof.  Three support remedies were then 
used that included crib walls, cable bolts and polyurethane grout 
(Zelanko et al., 1996). 
 
 Two concrete crib walls were built in crosscuts between the 
sink hole and secondary escape way and across the dominant 
joint set to act as breaker walls (figure 2).  Each wall was about 
15.2 m long, 9.1 m high, and 1.8 m wide, and composed of six 
four-point concrete cribs.  The walls consisted of pre cast 
reinforced concrete sections that were stacked as four point cribs 
interlocked at specified positions.  The walls were topped at the 
each of the crib corners with 1.83-meter-high timber crib packs.  
Grout bags were placed on the top of the timber cribs and 
pressurized to lock the crib walls in place resulting in about 
4,270 kN of active force being applied to the roof.   
 
 To provide reinforcement along the dominant joint set, fully 
grouted tensioned cable bolts were also installed in the secondary 
escape way behind crib wall A (figure 2).  The bolts were made 
from a 1.5 cm diameter, 7-strand cable with a minimum breaking 
strength of 258 kN.  A total of 81 cable bolts were installed on a 
3-m offset row spacing.  To intersect the dominate near vertical 
joint set, the cables were installed at a 30-degree angle from 
vertical with half the cables angled inby and half outby from the 
portal in an alternating row pattern.  A cable length of 9.1 m was 
used to allow anchorage into the upper limestone and the 
suspension of the lower limestone and shale layers from the 
upper limestone.  Prior to grouting, the cables were pre-tensioned 
to 200 kN.   
 
 To reduce the permeability and increase the strength of the 
roof, polyurethane grout was pumped into the roof at five 
locations.  These locations were the most highly fractured zones 
in the secondary escape way and were near crib wall A.  A total of 
2,470 kg of grout was injected.  
 
INSTRUMENTATION 
 
 To monitor long term stability in the reinforced secondary 
escape, four multi-point wire extensometers were installed in the 
roof in mid 1995.  Three of the extensometers (1, 2 and 4) were 
placed in the reinforced section of the secondary escapeway and 
one (3) in the unsupported entry adjacent to crib wall B (figure 2).  
A fifth extensometer would be installed during 2002, in the entry 
adjacent to crib wall B and inby extensometer 3.  The roof 
anchors were placed at depths of 8.23, 7.01, 6.1, 3.05, 2.13, and 
0.3 m.  The 8.23-meter anchor was above the cable bolt depth 
and used as the reference point for analysis of roof movement.  
The extensometers were read with a data logger so a continuous 
record of roof movement was obtained.   
 
 
1996 ROOF FAILURE 
 
 In October 1996, a roof fall occurred adjacent to the sinkhole 
near crib wall B that extended along the dominant joint set and 
encompassed an area from 6.1 to 15.2 m wide and 45.7 m long 
(figures 1 and 2).  Most of the roof fall was only a few feet thick.  
However, one large block of rock estimated to be 4.3 to 5.6 m 
thick, 5.6 m wide and 9.1 m long weighing an estimated 4,500 kN 
fell from the roof and damaged the crib wall.  The roof cavity 
where the large block fell extended to a depth of about 6.1 m 
possibly through the shale.  Upon falling, the large block rotated 
upon striking the floor and a corner of the rock impacted the lower 
portion of the crib wall with a blow resulting in the collapse of one 
half or three crib sections of the wall (figure 5).  However, the wall 
was not designed to take a dynamic side load from a 4,500 kN 
rock falling nearly 9.1 m.  The impact was sufficiently violent to 
knock concrete crib blocks 15.2 m into the entry.  Although the 
wall did partially fail, it did break the roof failure and prevented 
any extension of the roof fall into the entry beyond the crib wall. 
  
 Examination of the fall revealed that the block fell out 
between two near vertical joints orientated N 70  E that extended 
up through lower limestone to the shale.  Further, the area was 
partially surrounded or isolated by collapsed roof.  This partial 
isolation further reduced any confining forces along the joints that 
failed.  Water was also present along the joints and roof in the 
area further weakening the shale above the immediate limestone 
roof and reducing the joint cohesion over time.   
 
 The roof instrumentation gave no clear indications that the 
large block of rock was about to fall as the wall was positioned 
between the failing roof and the extensometers.  Also, none of the 
Figure 4.  Dominant joint set (N 70 ˚E) that is nearly 
perpendicular to the entry and parallel to the high wall. 
 
 
  
extensometers were located between the joints that outlined the 
large block.  Approximately, 0.25 cm of movement had occurred 
at extensometer 3 located in the unsupported zone closest to the 
failure, however this movement had occurred nearly 8 to 12 
months prior to the failure with most of this movement less than 
2.1 m into the roof. 
 
 
LONG-TERM MONITORING OF INSTRUMENTATION 
 
 Of the four original roof extensometers, only extensometer 3 
has shown any significant roof movement.  Extensometer 3 is 
located in the unsupported entry near crib wall B and in the 
vicinity of a major joint from which water has continuously 
dripped. 
 
 Figure 6 shows the roof movement at the various anchor 
horizons for extensometer 3.  On the figure, the roof movement is 
for an anchor at a given roof depth with respect to the 8.1 m 
reference anchor.  Between November 1995 and August 2002 
over 0.63 cm of total movement of the roofline was detected with 
about 0.25 cm movement between 0.3 and 2.1 m movement and 
0.25 cm between the roofline and 0.3 m.  Through 1999, 
accelerated movements were initiated in November 1995, 
between late October 1996 and March 1997 and mid March 1998.  
There appears to be a seasonal pattern to the movement with the 
accelerated movement initiating in the fall or winter.  Through 
March 2000, a fairly large amount of movement occurred but the 
movement was relatively shallow in the roof with most of the 
movement below 2.1 m.  Since March 2000, there has been less 
than 0.13 cm of roof movement.  However, most of this movement 
has been between 3.0 and 6.1 m into the roof, clearly much 
deeper than the previous movement. 
 
 Through mid 2000, the other extensometers 1, 2, and 4 have 
shown little or no movement.  Roof movement, if any, has been 
less than 0.025 cm, which is near the detectable limits of the 
instrumentation.  In general, the area that has been supported 
with cable bolts behind crib wall A has remained stable. 
 
 
DECISION TO EXTEND THE REINFORCED ZONE 
 
 Beginning in March and April of 2000 a pattern of roof 
movement was observed at extensometer 3 that would lead to the 
decision to reinforce the entry adjacent to the damaged crib wall.  
Figure 7 shows the roof movement from July of 1999 to August of 
2002.  Again, the roof movement is for an anchor at a given roof 
depth with respect to the 8.1 m reference anchor.  Although 
nearly an order of magnitude smaller, these roof movements were 
occurring at much greater depths than previously detected 
(figure 6).  During this time period, only about 0.12 cm of 
movement was measured.  However, most of this movement 
occurred between 3.0 and 6.1 m into the roof, the depth of the 
October 1996 roof collapse that partially destroyed the crib wall.  
 
 
 For three consecutive years, the roof movements were 
initiated in late January to mid-February.  After each period of 
accelerated movement, there was a period with little or no 
movement.  This movement pattern suggests that overall roof 
conditions are still stable.  However, continued seasonal 
movement could result in a destabilization of the roof and 
eventually a large roof fall (Zavodini, 2000).  Therefore, because 
of this pattern of deeper seasonal movement, a decision was 
made to develop and initiate a roof reinforcement plan to support 
the section of entry adjacent to the damaged crib wall. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Crib wall B damaged by fall of large rock, 
October 1996. 
Figure 7.  Roof movement measured at extensometer 
three between July 1999 and August 2002. 
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Figure 6.  Roof movement measured at extensometer 3 
between October 1995 and August 2002.  Note: the gap 
in the data from March to July 1999 resulted from 
damage to the extensometer. 
 
  
 
 
 
ROOF SUPPORT DESIGN 
 
 Although the area in the entry behind the damaged crib wall 
is technically not part of the secondary escape- way, continued 
extension of the fall along the direction of the dominant joint set 
would extend the failure to the escape- way.  Further, the entry 
provides direct access to the hydrostatic chamber area and the 
old mine works.  Therefore, a three-phase reinforcement plan was 
devised to support the entry behind the damaged crib wall.  This 
plan included the construction of a new crib wall, and the 
installation of both roof bolts and cable support.  Figure 2 shows 
the extended support area adjacent to the secondary escapeway.  
Because the reinforced secondary escapeway had remained 
stable and that crib wall B actually broke the roof fall, the design 
of the reinforcement for the new area was based to a large extent 
on the previous successful design.   
 
 Another component of the plan was the installation of more 
instrumentation during 2002 to monitor roof behavior and add a 
further element of safety as work progressed in the entry that was 
to be supported.  A fifth extensometer was placed in the center of 
the entry between the two joints along which the 1996 rock fall 
occurred (figure 2).  Further, three roof to floor convergence 
monitors were installed just 1.52 m inby the new crib wall toward 
the roof fall in the crosscut (figure 2). 
 
Crib Wall 
 
 A new crib wall (C) was built across the entrance of the cross 
cut just behind crib wall B (Figure 2).  Figure 8 shows the 
completed crib wall that extends for a length of 21.3 m and covers 
two major joints, spaced 18.3 m apart.  The crib wall was built on 
a steel reinforced concrete pad that was either 0.3 or 0.6 m thick 
depending of the floor elevation.  A total of 9 interlocking 4-point 
cribs were erected with the height of the concrete crib portion of 
the wall being 6.71 to 7.01 m.  The crib blocks were made from 
steel reinforced concrete were 0.61 m by 0.3 m and 1.83 m long.  
 
 
 Sixty-centimeter diameter thin-walled steel containers that 
were 1.22 to 1.68 m high were placed on the corners of each four-
point crib and pumped full of a 1,000 psi compressive strength 
grout.  Prestressing cells were then placed on the filled 
containers.  The cans are a stiffer system than the wood timber 
packs used on the original walls.  Further, the cans will minimize 
any long-term creep and moisture affects that can occur with the 
wood cribs.  These prestressing cells were 66 cm in diameter and 
consisted of two thin metal sheets that were welded around the 
perimeter to form a circular pancake cell.  An inlet valve allowed 
the cells to be pressurized with a polyurethane resin.  The grout-
filled wall was then pressurized specially designed flat jacks 
placed on top of each can.  Each flat jack was pressurized to 
between 0.34 and 0.69 MPa resulting in a total load of between 
3,560 to 4,000 kN being applied to the roof and crib wall.  Once 
the resin hardened, the cells provided a rigid support system. 
 
 During wall pressurization the data from the roof to floor 
convergence monitors and extensometers 3 and 5 were 
examined.  When the wall was pressurized, no movement was 
detected on any of the instruments. 
 
Roof Bolts and Mesh 
 
 The roof bolts and mesh system installed prior to the cable 
bolts was designed to provide support to the immediate roof and 
prevent the fall of surface material from the roof.  An area of 
approximately 280-m square of entry adjacent to the new crib wall 
were supported with a 2.22 cm, grade 60, fully grouted torque 
tension bolts installed on a 1.52 m by 1.52 m pattern.  A two-piece 
resin system was used with a fast set on top and a slow set resin 
on the bottom.  This resulted in the upper 0.91 m providing 
anchorage for the lower tensioned portion of the bolt.  The applied 
bolt torque was between 28 and 41 m-kg.  Depending on the 
depth of the major bedding plane separation in the immediate 
roof, the length of the bolt varied from 2.44 to 3.05 m as the 
system was designed to be anchored above the main bedding 
fractures that ranged in depth from 1.52 to 2.44 m into the roof.  In 
conjunction with the bolts, a 4-gauge welded wire mesh with a 
10.2 by 10.2 cm opening size was installed to provide surface 
control and to minimize the risk of injury to workers from minor 
rock falls. 
 
Cable support  
 
 Thirty fully grouted cables bolts were installed in the entry 
adjacent to the new crib wall.  A Dywidag Z-Bulb cable bolt was 
used that consisted of a no. 6 (1.52 cm diameter), 7-wire strand, 
ASTM Grade 270 cable with a minimum breaking strength 
260 kN.  To minimize corrosion, the cable bolts were galvanized.  
This cable bolt was different than that used in the original 
installation where a thread bar was used to tension the cable 
because the manufacturer no longer makes the older thread bar 
type of cable bolt.  With the new system, a barrel and wedge 
anchor head were used to tension the cable and to secure the 
bearing plate.   
 
 The cable bolts were 9.1 m long and installed on a 3-m row 
spacing with alternate rows offset by 1.52 m.  This pattern 
resulted in 5 rows of cables across the entry with 6 cables per 
row.  Approximately 18.3 m of entry adjacent to the new crib wall 
was reinforced with cables.  The cable bolts were angled at 30˚ 
from vertical with alternating rows of the cables angled inby and 
outby from the portal.  Again the system is designed to reinforce 
the dominant joint set with at least 2 cables bolts intersecting 
each joint.  Essentially, the design of the cable bolt pattern is 
similar to the pattern used in the original cable bolt installation in 
the secondary escapeway. 
 
 The cables were installed in a 4.13 cm hole.  However, the 
initial anchor was developed from a resin grout cartridge placed in 
a 3.49 cm hole along the upper 2.4 m of the bolt.  Three Z-bulbs 
anchors created along the upper 1.5 m of the cable were used to 
increase the anchorage capacity in section where the resin 
cartridge developed the initial pre-tensioned anchor.  A 1.2 m long 
steel tube was placed along the lower portion to stiffen the cable 
during insertion of the cable through the grout cartridge.  The 
resin anchor was allowed to set over night before the cable was 
tensioned to between 89 to 98 kN using a cable-tensioning unit.  
The cables were tensioned against 20.3 by 20.3 cm, high capacity 
Figure 8.  New crib wall C covering the crosscut in front 
of damaged crib wall. 
 
 
 
(grade 5), domed bearing plates.  Two small holes were drilled in 
the dome of the bearing plates to allow for the breather and grout 
tubes to be installed for the grouting operation.  Once the cable 
had been tensioned, the remainder of the hole and cable were 
fully grouted using a pumpable cement grout.   
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 A large roof fall did occur in the fall of 1996 that destroyed a 
portion of crib wall B.  The entry adjacent to the crib wall was then 
reinforced about six years later.  However, during this time, the 
data from the instrumentation installed in the roof was 
continuously evaluated to determine if any changes occurred in 
the roof behavior.   
 
 Prior to 2000, although there was a fairly large amount of 
movement at extensometer 3, this movement was relatively 
shallow, below 2.1 m.  The movement would occur as a sudden 
accelerated movement followed by a period of deceleration and 
finally by a period of little movement.  Extensometer 3 was also 
near a major joint and apparently was detecting the loosening of 
the lower roof around the joint.  Further, this movement occurred 
seasonally usually in the late fall or early winter.  Because of the 
pattern and timing of roof movement, the cause of the movement 
appears to be external.  The external stimuli for this movement 
probably is related to the seasonal conditions and changes that 
occur in the late fall or early winter.   
 
 Beginning in 2000, the pattern of roof movement at 
extensometer 3 changed.  Although the movement was an order 
of magnitude less, the movement was much deeper into the roof 
and appears to involve the roof up through the shale-claystone at 
a depth between 4.27 to 6.1 m.  Proximity of extensometer 3 to 
the major unsupported joint is also of concern where the deeper 
movement could indicate that the joint was now becoming active.  
Though instability near a major fracture may reflect just the local 
instability in the vicinity of the joint, continued movement near 
such joints could destabilize larger blocks of rock leading to the 
extension of the roof fall into the entry. 
 
 This latest roof movement pattern has also been seasonal 
with the initial accelerated movement occurring from late January 
to mid February for three consecutive years, from 2000 to 2002.  
The time frame is similar to when the main collapse occurred that 
caused the sinkhole formation.  The periods of accelerated 
movement are again probably the result of external stimuli that is 
related to the winter season.  However, it is not known whether 
this movement is related to ice and the change in the effective 
stress due to increased water levels such as may have occurred 
in the original failure.  With the formation of the sink hole, the area 
should be well drained since there was no ice builds up near the 
collapsed wall or extensometer 3.  However, this period does 
correspond to the coldest time of the year and to the coldest time 
in the mine.  January/February temperatures near this location 
underground average between 7.2 to 10 oC while summer 
temperatures average about 18.3 oC.  Although the change in 
temperature within the area underground is seasonally only 8.3 to 
11 oC, this area appears to have little confining stress across the 
joints.  Therefore, any contraction of the rock mass due to lower 
temperatures would further reduce any small confining stress 
across the joints (Hooker and Duvall 1971).  For the present, the 
roof movement pattern suggests that the roof conditions are still 
stable.  After each period of accelerated movement, the 
movement decelerates and there is a period with little or no 
movement.  Essentially, the forces that trigger the movement are 
of limited duration and once reduced, allow the roof to again 
reach equilibrium. 
 
 Whatever the cause though, continued seasonal application 
of the external stimuli could ultimately lead to the destabilization 
of the main roof and eventually, a large roof fall similar to the one 
that damaged the crib wall.  Further, to eliminate or reduce the 
affects of the external stimuli that are causing the roof movement 
would be difficult, whether it is water and ice or temperature.  
Therefore, because of this pattern of deeper movement, a 
decision was made to develop and initiate a roof reinforcement 
plan to support the section of entry behind the damaged crib wall. 
 
 In designing the reinforcement system for the entry adjacent 
to the secondary escapeway, a 3-component system was 
developed where each component in the reinforcement plan 
contributes to maintaining the stability and function of the entry.  
The new crib wall acts as a breaker to prevent the extension of 
the failure along the dominant joint set into the entry and toward 
the escapeway.  The roof bolts and wire mesh provide support to 
the immediate roof in between the cable bolts and also surface 
control.  Finally, the cable bolts provide reinforcement along the 
dominant joint set behind the wall.  In addition, the continued 
monitoring of the instrumentation will provide a basis for 
evaluating the reinforcement effectiveness and long-term roof 
stability.     
 
 During installation and pressurization of the new crib wall, 
roof to floor convergence meters and extensometers 3 and 5 
detected no roof movement.  This lack of movement indicates that 
there were no major separations that were closed near the wall 
during pressurization.  Further, locally the application of a 
3,560 kN force can be significant, but the effects dissipate rapidly 
with distance.  At extensometer 3, located approximately 3 m from 
the wall, where significant lower roof movement had occurred, 
there was no roof movement from wall pressurization. 
 
 The data from the instrumentation in the reinforced 
escapeway shows that little or no roof movement has occurred 
and therefore the area has remained stable since the summer of 
1994 when the escapeway was reinforced.  This provides strong 
evidence of the success of the design of the reinforcement 
system.  Even though crib wall B failed, the wall did act as a 
breaker to the fall where the wall performed it’s main function, to 
prevent the extension of the fall into the entry.  Therefore, the 
design of the new reinforcement system for the entry could be 
based to a large extent on the previous design used in the 
secondary escapeway. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The original reinforcement system consisting of cable bolts 
and crib walls have maintained the stability of the secondary 
escapeway with little or no movement being detected despite the 
proximity of the sinkhole and major joint structures in the roof that 
extend from the failure.  Further, even though a crib wall was 
partially destroyed by a large rock fall, the crib wall did break the 
fall and prevent the fall from extending into the entry.  Therefore, 
the original reinforcement design and system can be considered 
successful.   
 
 Ultimately, based on roof movement detected by the roof 
instrumentation, a decision was made to extend the reinforcement 
into the entry behind the damaged crib wall.  If the entry was left 
unprotected, the failure could extend across the entry and up to 
the secondary escapeway.  Therefore, the instrumentation 
installed to monitor roof movement was a valuable tool on which 
decisions concerning the stability of the entry and the need for 
further reinforcement were made.  Although there was a fairly 
 
 
 
large amount of movement in the lower roof, it was the much 
smaller, but deeper, roof movement that triggered the decision to 
install more reinforcement.   
 
 Because of the success of the original reinforcement, the 
design of reinforcement in the entry was based to a large degree 
on that original system.  Since the performance of the original 
reinforcement was successful, the new system should provide 
adequate protection to the entry and secondary escapeway.  
Further, continued monitoring of the roof instrumentation will 
provide a measure of the performance of the reinforcement and 
an evaluation of the stability of the area adjacent to the sinkhole.     
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